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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
EMER KENT WESTWARD, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 940530-CA 
REPLY BRffiF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE MISAPPREHENDS THE SCOPE OF THE 
OFFENSE OF FORGERY. 
Before one can properly evaluate the state's arguments, it is necessary to 
fully appreciate the difference between the state's theory of the scope of the offense as 
defined by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 and the theory which defendant advances. 
In his opening brief, the defendant conceded that the state's theory of the 
case, as it related to the alleged victimization of Packer and Mountain America Credit 
Union, fell within the scope of the offense of forgery. The defendant argued only that 
the evidence did not support a conviction under such a theory. See Appellant's Brief 
at 17-21, 29-30. 
With respect to the state's theory that the defendant intended to defraud 
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Bauers, Bassetts, and ERA Realty, the defendant not only argues that the evidence will 
not support a conviction under these theories (id. at 26-29), defendant contends that the 
wrongs allegedly committed against these !Victims" do not fall within the scope of the 
charged offense because there is no legal nexus between defendant's purpose in making 
the "unauthorized" endorsement and any fraud allegedly perpetrated against Bauers, 
Bassetts, or ERA Realty. See id. at 21-26. 
The state dismisses this argument, stating only: 
The fault with defendant's arguments is the fact that the victim(s) 
of defendant's "purpose to defraud" need not be identified in order 
to obtain a forgery conviction; so long as there was sufficient 
evidence to establish that he had such an intent toward someone, 
the state's burden is met. 
Appellee's Brief at 20 (emphasis added). 
The state then discounts defendant's reliance on State v. Rios, 246 Kan. 
517, 792 P.2d 1065 (1990), contending that the definition of "intent to defraud" under 
Kansas law "add[s] additional requirements" to the offense of forgery, i.e., deception, 
inducement, and reliance. Appellee's Brief at 20, fn. 5. The state seems to be unaware 
that these are the elements of fraud under Utah law and that "defraud" is the verb form 
of the noun "fraud". See Appellant's Brief at 22-23. 
The state insists that the definition of "purpose to defraud" which it 
extracts from State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1991), dispenses with 
the necessity of demonstrating deception, inducement, or reliance. 
Gonzalez is not a legislative enactment. Its holding can be no broader 
than the issues presented by the facts of that case. It cannot reasonably be read so as 
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to dispense with the traditional elements of fraud: these were all clearly established by 
the facts of that case. Nor can Gonzalez be read as dispensing with the requirement 
that there be a nexus between these elements. Gonzalez attempted to induce the 
would-be victim to rely upon the false writing. The false writing was the instrumentality 
of the intended fraud. In the context of the facts of that case, the language upon which 
the state relies is a statement of traditional legal principles. Gonzalez talks in terms of 
flus[ing] a false writing . . . in order to gain" an advantage. (Emphasis added.) 
In a forgery offense, the false writing is the instrumentality of the 
fraudulent objective. The state initially suggests that the false writing must be one of 
the acts "upon which the completion of the fraud depend[s]". Appellee's Brief at 24-25. 
While the state pays lip service to the concept that "the completion of the fraud" must 
depend upon the false writing, the state never indicates why perpetration of an 
unarticulated fraud against Bauers, Bassetts, or ERA Realty was dependant upon the 
forgery of the subject endorsement. The state ultimately argues: "[E]ven if the jurors 
found that defendant intended to defraud different people or to do so in different ways, 
all of which culminated in the forged check, they were justified in convicting defendant 
of forgery . . . . " Appellee's Brief at 27. (Emphasis added.) The state's earlier allusion 
to a nexus requirement evaporates with this argument. 
In substance and effect, the state concludes that the nexus requirement 
is satisfied by proof of nothing more than the fact that an advantage was gained in a 
transaction which "culminated" in making of a false writing. Such a nexus would be 
established by the facts of the hypothetical which appears in footnote 10 on page 22 of 
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Appellant's Brief. 
While shopping, H discovers that he has forgotten his checkbook 
and has mistakenly brought a checkbook belonging to W, his wife. 
H is not authorized to sign on W's account. He proceeds to the 
checkout stand intending to make the purchase by signing W's 
name to a check, confident that W will ratify the act. In ringing up 
the purchases the cashier mistakenly charges H $4 for an item 
which costs $6. H notices the error but says nothing. He 
completes the purchase, signing W's name to the check. 
Under the state's theory, H is guilty of forgery even if W ratifies H's 
signature and W's bank pays the check upon presentment. The payment of the 
instrument does not alter the fact that H did not have authority to sign the instrument 
or the fact that he used it in order to take advantage of the cashier's mistake. H 
obtained an "advantage" in a transaction which "culminated" in the making of a false 
writing. Indeed, one could even argue that "the completion of [H's] fraud depended" 
upon the "forgery" because he had no other way of completing the transaction. 
According to the state, "the on-going fraud against the Bauers, Vicki 
Bassett and ERA Realty" provides the requisite "purpose to defraud" and will support 
the defendant's conviction.1 Appellee's Brief at 24. The argument logically continues: 
The "fraud" perpetrated "against the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and ERA Realty" can be 
established without regard to the defendant's purpose in endorsing the check. Indeed, 
that "fraud" would have been established whether the endorsement was false or genuine. 
The state makes this assertion undaunted by the trial court's conclusions that there was no fraud 
perpetrated against ERA Realty (R 1042,1045-46) or the Bauers (R 1238) and without identifying any fraud 
which was perpetrated against Bassetts. Although the validity of many of the state's arguments presupposes 
the factual, as well as the legal, validity of the claims regarding frauds allegedly perpetrated against Bauers, 
Bassetts, and ERA Realty, the state did not respond to the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence offered in support of these claims. See Appellant's Brief at 26-29. Indeed, the state suggests that 
these challenges "need not be addressed by this Court.11 Appellee's Brief at 24. 
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Even if the defendant endorsed the check in absolute good faith erroneously believing 
that he was authorized, he is guilty of forgery. His "purpose to defraud" is established 
by the "fraud" he perpetrated against "the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and ERA Realty", which 
"fraud" is established notwithstanding the defendant's goodwill toward Packer and 
Mountain America without regard to his good faith in making the endorsement. 
The scope of the offense of forgery is not reasonably extended to 
circumstances where there is no nexus between the fraud perpetrated and the 
defendant's purpose in making the false writing. See discussion in Point VI, supra. 
POINT II 
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING JURY 
UNANIMITY ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
The state's view of the scope of offense of forgery forms the basis of its 
response to defendant's arguments regarding jury unanimity. 
The plain language of both the statute and the instruction [No. 14-
C] make clear that the jury need not identify either the particular 
fraud or the specific victim in order to decide whether defendant 
acted with "a purpose to defraud". . . . Consequently, even if the 
jurors found that defendant intended to defraud different people 
or to do so in different ways, all of which culminated in the forged 
check, they were justified in convicting defendant of forgery so long 
as they found that he acted with a "purpose to defraud anyone". 
Appellee's Brief at 27. 
Even if the state were correct in its view of the scope of this offense, the 
verdict nevertheless cannot stand. Jury unanimity means more than a conclusory 
agreement that the defendant has violated the statute in question. There is a 
requirement of substantial agreement as to the principal factual elements underlying a 
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specified offense. See United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1110-15 (CA6 1988); 
United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 461 (CA3 1987); United States v. Gipson, 533 F.2d 
453, 456-59 (CA5 1977). This is not to say that "each bit of evidence must be 
unanimously credited or entirely disregarded, but it does require unanimous agreement 
as to the nature of the defendant's violation, not simply the fact that a violation has 
occurred." McKov v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1237 n.5, 
108 L.Ed. 2d 369, 385 n.5 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
The state argues that under its theory of the scope of this offense, "the 
jury need not identify either the particular fraud or the specific victim". The state 
apparently contends that it logically follows that the jury need not unanimously agree 
upon "either the particular fraud or the specific victim." This argument is clearly without 
merit. 
Furthermore, the state fails to address defendant's argument that even 
though the jurors may have unanimously agreed on a particular fraud or a specific 
victim, they may have agreed upon a theory which had no factual or legal viabiUty. See 
Appellant's Brief at 20-21. 
POINT III 
THE VARIANCE BETWEEN THE BILL OF PARTICULARS 
AND THE PROOF OFFERED AT TRIAL PREJUDICED THE 
DEFENDANT AND THIS CLAIM OF ERROR HAS NOT 
BEEN WAIVED. 
As discussed in Point I, supra, a theory of criminal responsibility based 
upon an intent to defraud Nicole Packer is at variance, factually and legally, with a 
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theory under which Bauers, Bassetts, or ERA Realty is the alleged victim. 
The state argues that notwithstanding the fact that Nicole Packer had been 
identified as the alleged victim in the bill of particulars, the defendant should have been 
on notice as to the scope and theory of the offense which the state intended to advance 
because the defendant had received copies of the original information charging him and 
his wife with several offenses, had reviewed the probable cause statement, and had 
attended the preliminary hearing. Appellee's Brief at 17. This argument assumes that 
the defendant should have known that he would be tried for the 'Svrongs11 which 
provided the basis for charges which had been fQed against him and subsequently 
dismissed as well as the ,!wrongsM which provided the basis for the charges which were 
pending against his wife. Clearly this claim is without merit. 
Finally, the state argues that the defendant failed to request a continuance 
and therefore waived any claim based upon the variance. This argument is also without 
merit. As soon as it because apparent that the state would not be bound by its bill of 
particulars, the defendant moved for a mistrial. This was a request for the ultimate 
continuance. 
The state relies upon State v. Fulton, 743 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988). In Fulton, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The principal underlying the variance rule was eloquently stated in 
State v. Mvers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 372, 302 P.2d 276, 280 (1956): 
It would be a mockery of the constitutional rights of 
defendant to allow the state to falsely state the 
particulars of the offense charged and then without 
amendment and without giving defendant additional 
time to meet new evidence beyond these particulars 
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obtain a conviction founded on said evidence. 
For this reason, whenever the prosecution changes its position, a 
defendant may seek a continuance. If the trial court finds the 
variance to be prejudicial, it must grant a continuance as a matter 
of right. See id.; State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 311-12, 67 P.2d 647, 
654 (1937)(Wolfe J., concurring); cf. State v. Burnett 712 P.2d 260, 
261-62 (Utah 1985). 
742 P.2d at 1215. 
It is interesting to note that Fulton cites Burnett as authority. Burnett is 
the principal case upon which defendant relied in arguing this issue in his opening brief. 
Appellant's Brief at 15-17. In Burnett, the defendant moved for a mistrial in response 
to the state's departure from the theory outlined in the information. When that motion 
was denied the defendant did not make a separate motion for a continuance. Burnett's 
conviction was reversed based upon the prejudicial variance. 
In substance, the state argues that a motion for a continuance is sufficient 
to preserve the issue but a motion for mistrial is not. Counsel is not aware of any 
authority supporting such a proposition. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
Purpose to Defraud Packer. The state argues: "The mere act of endorsing Packer's 
name to the check without authority was sufficient to imply a purpose to defraud and 
meet the State's burden of proof on this element of forgery." Appellee's Brief at 21. 
The state has not addressed the defendant's argument that an inference of a purpose 
to defraud does not arise if surrounding facts and circumstances indicate the possibility 
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that the endorsement was made for a legitimate purpose. See Appellant's Brief at 17-
19. 
The state then reviews the direct evidence of defendant's intent to 
defraud. In so doing, the state argues: "[T]he jury was justified in believing Packer's 
testimony that, although she agreed to accept $1,000 for her part in the transactions, she 
did so only because the defendant led her to believe that $1,000 was one third of the 
expected profits (Tr. Vol. I. 937)." Appellee's Brief at 21-22 (emphasis added). This 
is the state's "flagship" example of direct evidence of the defendant's intent to defraud 
Packer. 
A review of that portion of the record which the state cites demonstrates 
that the state's summary of Packer's testimony materially distorts the evidence. The 
following is the testimony which the state purports to have summarized: 
Q. [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Okay, were you ultimately paid 
some money for doing what it is you told defendant Emer Kent 
Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward you would do? 
A. [BY MS. PACKER] Yes. 
Q. How much were you paid? 
A. One thousand dollars. 
Q. And when you received the thousand dollars, did you think that 
that was your full payment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you think that represented? 
A. One-third of what would have been $3,000.00 which would have 
been the profit. 
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R937. 
Packer never testified that she agreed to accept a thousand dollars 
because the defendant led her to believe that the profit in the transaction was $3,000.00. 
Packer's testimony under cross-examination indicates that there were apparently several 
discussions about projected profits and that in these discussions the projections 'Varied11 
apparently with the discussion of different possible scenarios. She was unable to relate 
any specific projection. Packer's testimony on this point is completely reconcilable with 
the defendant's testimony. Appellant's Brief at 19-21. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that at the time the defendant and his wife agreed to pay Packer $1,000.00 
they knew what the net profit would be. 
The state has apparently scoured the trial record in an attempt to locate 
any available evidence which provides direct proof of the defendant's intent to defraud 
Packer. It has fallen short. 
Purpose to Defraud Bassett. After identifying Bassett as the defendant's client, the 
state's factual summary continues: 
Defendant told [Bassett] that she needed to secure a home to 
appear stable and to help her position in the custody battle (Tr. 
Vol. I. 915-16). She explained that she did not have money for a 
down payment, and defendant said he had located a home which 
she could purchase without any money down (Tr. Vol. I. 895-96; 
Vol. II. 1065, 1069). 
Appellee's Brief at 8-9. 
The state returns to this theme in a footnote: 
Although Bassett agreed to pay 11% interest, the paperwork at 
closing reflected 13% interest (Tr. Vol. I. 915-16). When the 
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witness asked defendant about it, he told her that she didn't have 
to complete the deal then stressed to her how much more stable 
she would appear in the custody matter if she had a home (id.). 
Appellee's Brief at 9, fn. 3 (emphasis added). 
This summary obviously suggests that the defendant attempted to interest 
his client in securing a home when she was apparently not in the market. This he 
accomplished by using knowledge of her personal difficulties and by suggesting that it 
would be good strategy in the custody contest in which he was representing her. The 
summary further suggests that when Pat Williams insisted on an interest rate of 13%, 
the defendant overcame any resistance Bassett may have had to closing the transaction 
by "stress[ing] to her how much more stable she would appear in the custody matter if 
she had a home." 
The state supports these statements with two citations to the same two 
pages of the trial transcript. At that point in the record, Bassett testifies that when she 
got to the closing the interest rate on the note which was to be assigned to Williams was 
13 rather than 11 percent. Defense counsel than asked Bassett whether or not the 
defendant told her that she was not obligated to close the transaction. Bassett responds: 
Yes, he did, but Kent at that time knew the situation with my 
children. My children were putting pressure on me to get this 
custody thing over with. They wanted to come back and live with 
their mother and I was facing, at that time, a home study with a 
social worker. I needed to show stability. I needed to show the 
social worker that I had a place to put all three of my children and 
that, basically, I didn't have to live with my mother; that I could 
support myself and my kids. 
R 915-16. 
The state has clearly taken a great deal of liberty in summarizing this 
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testimony. 
Bassett was separated from her husband and was living with her mother. 
Her children were living with her former husband. She and her present husband were 
trying to find a home of their own in hopes of effecting a reconciliation (R 895, 906) 
but, in Mrs. Bassett's own words: "We couldn't find anything, quite honestly" (R 907). 
Through the subject transaction, Bassett was able to get into a home 
although she had no money to make a down payment or pay closing costs. 
Furthermore, she conceded that her monthly payment on the promissory note which Pat 
Williams now holds is equivalent to the fair rental value of the subject property (R 907). 
While the record is not clear as to how much Mrs. Bassett knew or 
understood about the overall transaction, the following excerpts from her testimony 
indicate that she was aware of the elements of the transaction even if she did not 
understand the significance of all of the information that she possessed. 
Q. [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Okay. And how were you to pay 
this $58,000.00? 
A. [MRS. BASSETT] Kent knew that I didn't have a down 
payment and Dan didn't have any money. I knew that my credit 
wasn't well-enough established. I had only been divorced a little 
over a year and my credit wasn't established well enough to be 
able to get that kind of a loan, and so he said that he would seek 
private financing for me. 
Q. Okay. And did he tell you that he ultimately did that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And do you know who you bought your house from? 
A. Well, I purchased the home from a middle person, who I later 
found out would be Nicole Packer. 
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Q. And who told you there would be a middle person? 
A. Kent and Kim both. 
Q. Okay. Did you know who Nicole Packer was at that time? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How did you know who she was? 
A. At that time she was associated with Kim in the capacity of her 
real estate assistant and I had done several services for her. 
R 896-97. 
* * * 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] You were fully aware of what Kent 
and Kim Winward's relationship with Nicole Packer was, weren't 
you? 
A. [BY MRS. BASSETT] Yes. 
Q. And as far as you knew, Nicole Packer was the owner of that 
home, is that correct? 
A. No. She was the middle person from the original seller. 
Q. Okay. So, then, they did tell you that Nicole was purchasing 
the property — had contracted to purchase the property and would 
sell it to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So, you were not in the dark on that, is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anybody misrepresent to you what Nicole Packer had 
purchased it for, anyone ever tell you what she had purchased it 
for? 
A. No. B u t l -
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Q. Did you ever ask? 
A. No, but I assumed that it would be somewhere close to 
$58,000.00. 
R 908-09. 
Williams purchased Bassetts' note at a substantial discount because 
Bassetts had either no credit or bad credit and the note had no payment history. Mrs. 
Bassett apparently did not understand that such a note would have to be sold at a 
substantial discount. Accordingly, she assumed that Packer and/or Winwards had made 
an $18,000.00 profit.2 
While the evidence may present some question regarding the ethical 
propriety of engaging in this transaction with one of his clients, defendant hopes that the 
foregoing clarification of the record will indicate that his conduct was not as outrageous 
as the state's factual summary would suggest. Certainly, no fraud was perpetrated upon 
the Bassetts. 
Q. [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Okay. Tell the jury what happened. When did you 
see Vicki Bassett? 
A. [BY MS. PACKER] Okay. Vicki did my nails and so I saw her regularly. 
Sometime in, probably, October we were discussing the transaction. She asked me 
what I had done with all my money and I said, "What money?" and she said, "The 
$18,000.00 you made on the sale of my house." I said, "Oh, you are mistaken. I 
made $1,000.00." She said, "No, you made $18,000.00." and I said, "Well, maybe I 
better go to the title company and check out some documents." So I went to the 
title company, started looking at documents. 
R 937-38. 
14 
POINT V 
THE STATE'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OFFERED BY HANS CHAMBERLAIN 
INACCURATELY SUMMARIZES THE RECORD. 
The state contends that defense counsel invited error by initiating a line 
of questioning under which Chamberlain was asked if he "could determine whether an 
intent to defraud exists given certain actions done within the guise of a partnership." 
Appellee's Brief at 29-30. The state then contends that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing Chamberlain to express his opinion as to whether or not the 
prosecutor's hypothetical "would show a purpose to defraud" because Chamberlain's 
testimony "assisted the jury on an issue first introduced by defendant". Appellee's Brief 
at 34. 
Defendant contends that the following fairly summarizes the series of 
misadventures which ultimately lead to the introduction of the challenged testimony. 
The record of Mr. Chamberlain's testimony is reproduced as Addendum H to Appellee's 
Brief for convenient reference. 
Chamberlain supposedly took the stand to rebut the defendant's 
contention that he, by virtue of his licensure as an attorney, possessed authority to 
endorse the subject check. As is clearly pointed out in his opening brief, defendant had 
never advanced such an argument. Defendant had testified that he and Packer were co-
venturers, not attorney and client. Appellant's Brief at 33-34. The state's brief on 
appeal assumes, without discussion, that Chamberlain's testimony on direct examination 
was properly received in rebuttal. Appellee's Brief at 28. 
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In eliciting this "rebuttal" testimony, the prosecutor asked Chamberlain to 
draw upon his own experience in interacting with his clients. The prosecutor then asked 
Chamberlain if he had an opinion as to whether or not a lawyer could sign a third 
party's name (presumably a client's) to a check without that person's knowledge or 
consent (R 1128). Defendant objected on the basis that the question did not provide 
a sufficient hypothetical to fit the facts of this case. The objection was overruled and 
Mr. Chamberlain testified: 
Assuming a hypothetical that you gave me, it would be my opinion 
— it would be improper for an attorney to sign a client's name to 
a check and deposit it into any account, including the lawyer's own 
account. 
R 1129. 
This opinion was followed by another question, another objection, and 
another opinion. This time Mr. Chamberlain cited Rule 1.13 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct relating to an attorney's obligation to keep safe and account for 
his client's property (R 1129-30). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to direct the jury's 
attention to the fact that the defendant's claim of implied authority arose by virtue of 
the fact that he and Packer were partners or co-venturers and was not based upon any 
alleged attorney/client relationship (R 1130-32). Counsel attempted to again direct 
Chamberlain's attention to his law practice and this time asked questions that related 
to his relationship with his law partners rather than his clients (R 1132-34). In 
responding to questions, by which defense counsel hoped to ehcit an opinion regarding 
authority implied by virtue of a partnership relationship, Chamberlain's answers 
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continually suggested the necessity of an express agreement between the partners (R 
1131-35). 
Because Chamberlain was apparently unwilling to concede that any 
authority was implied by his own partnership relationship, defense counsel changed the 
hypothetical to include two auto mechanics operating an automobile repair shop. In 
that hypothetical, the partners never discuss endorsing or depositing checks representing 
partnership funds. In the hypothetical, one of the partners endorses the other partner's 
name to such a check and deposits it into the partnership account. Defense coimsel 
specifically asks Mr. Chamberlain to assume, as a matter of fact, that the partner who 
endorsed the check did not intend to defraud the other partner. Defense counsel then 
asked Chamberlain if, under this hypothetical a forgery would have been committed (R 
1135-36).3 Chamberlain responded by stating that no forgery would have been 
committed because the check was deposited in the partnership account (R 1136). 
In an attempt to get Mr. Chamberlain to concede that no forgery is 
committed in the absence of intent to defraud, defense counsel again posed the 
hypothetical asking Chamberlain to assume that the check is not deposited in an account 
designated as the partnership account. Defense counsel again concluded the 
hypothetical stating: u[I]f there is no intent to defraud, is it forgery?" (R 1136). 
After requiring defense counsel to further flesh out the hypothetical, 
Chamberlain finally responded: 
Counsel concedes that this question is objectionable because it asked Mr. Chamberlain a question of law. 
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A. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Do all the partners know of the 
existence of that check I guess would be my question. 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] Well, assume they don't. Well let's 
assume its put in the partnership account and that there is no 
intent to defraud. Is that forgery? 
A. I don't know. I can't look into that person's mind to determine 
whether or not there is intent to defraud. 
MR. PENDLETON: Okay. That's my point. Thank you. No 
further questions. 
R 1136-37. 
Chamberlain's responses to defense counsel's hypotheticals had suggested 
to the jury that, even assuming no intent to defraud exists, a person may be guilty of 
forgery if the check was not deposited into the partnership account or if his partner did 
not have knowledge of the existence of the check. It was time to conclude this 
floundering cross-examination. 
On redirect examination the prosecutor posed another hypothetical. This 
time the prosecutor's hypothetical was an attempt to outline the facts of this case. The 
prosecutor then asked Chamberlain: "Do you have an opinion as to whether or not that 
would be with a purpose to defraud or forgery?" (R 1137) Defendant objected on the 
grounds that the opinion called for was beyond Chamberlain's "field of expertise" (R 
1137). The objection was overruled and Chamberlain testified: "In my opinion, that 
would be evidence of intent to defraud." (R 1138) Defense counsel was, with good 
reason, concerned that the jury would interpret this last opinion as an indication of how 
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Chamberlain himself would weigh the evidence in this case.4 
On recross-exai nination con msel attempted to formulate a hypothetical 
which would approximate the facts in evidence (R 1138-41) and then asked Chamberlain 
for one IIIOIC opmMir I JH-W, docs that [iitwnil Iht* juiy question x. It) wluMhci or not 
the person who signed the other partner's name acted with the intent to defraud?" (R 
] 1. 1 1). Then the following exchange took place: 
A. [BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN] Does that present a jury question? 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] Yes, does it present a jury question. 
A, As (o whether or not -- I'm sorry. 
Q. As to whether or not the person ~ 
MR. BURNS: Objection as to whether or not it presents a jury 
question, Your Honor. I think he can opine as to whether or not 
there is an intent to defraud. 
THE COURT:: I'm going to allow - Pendleton to place it in 
that framework. 
MR. BURNS: Okay. 
THE COI JR'I ': Whether or not it pi esents a jury qi lestion. 
Q. (By IvIr. Pendleton) Does it present a jury question as to 
whether or not that person who made the endorsement on behalf 
of the partner intended to defraud that partner? 
A. Yes, a jury question. 
R 1141-42 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Chamberlain then apparently felt compelled to add what he referred 
See exchange between defense counsel and Chamberlain at R 1142-43. 
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to as a "caveat": " . . . I don't think you told me in your assumption as to whether or not 
the person whose name was on the check said it was okay for the other person to sign 
her name to the check" (R 1142). Chamberlain's "caveat" suggested that if there was 
no express authorization to endorse the check, that fact would apparently affect his 
opinion as to whether or not a jury question was even presented. 
Apparently concerned that jurors may have gotten the impression that it 
was their duty to decide the issue of intent to defraud, the prosecutor took Chamberlain 
on redirect examination one more time. It is at this point that the exchange which is 
set out on page 35 of the defendant's opening brief takes place, ultimately resulting in 
the receipt of Mr. Chamberlain's opinion that the facts, as outlined in the prosecutor's 
hypothetical question, constituted "strong evidence of intent to defraud" (R 1144). 
While counsel concedes that this entire segment of the trial should be a 
source of embarrassment to all those involved, it was not defense counsel who opened 
the door to the admission of Chamberlain's opinion regarding the strength of the 
evidence. 
POINT VI 
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Joint Venture. The statement of the case in defendant's opening brief clearly identifies 
evidence supporting the requested instructions regarding joint venture. Appellant's Brief 
at 6-8. Furthermore, Packer's testimony to the effect that she and Winwards had a 
business arrangement in which they divided the duties and shared the profits is quoted 
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verbatim in the relevant argument. Appellant's Brief at 42-43. The jury should have 
been insti ucted as to tl le legal in lplications of si id i a i elationsl lip I\ Is Packer's question 
asked in response to defense counsel's question about her participation in a joint 
venture wit , defendant was indeed perceptive; 
A. [BY ^IS. PACKER] I've never called it a joint venture 
agreement. I didn't think of it in those terms. I don't know -
what are the implications or the repercussions of being in a joint 
venture with someone or is that just a fancy term that you're 
using? 
R 996. 
Counsel would venture a guess tl lat the ji u: 01 s did not know the answer 
to these questions either — probably just some "fancy term". 
While the proposed instructions were brief, they would have acquainted 
the jury with (1) the legal definition of a joint venture, (2) the fact that no particular 
formality or writing is required in order to form a joint venture, (3) that such a venture 
may be inferred by the conduct of the parties, and (4) that each member of the joint 
venture stands in the relationship of agent and principal to each member of the venture. 
Instead, the ji n y was given absoli itely no legal fi amework against \\ hich it could evaluate 
the facts of the case. 
The state c ontends that even, if the insti notions shoi ilci have been given, 
defendant suffered no prejudice in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury. 
The jury had the same information before it through defendant's 
cross-examination of Chamberlain and, because defendant chose 
not to argue the theory in his closing argument, the jurors were 
fully able to utilize the information in their deliberations regardless 
of whether they received it from the court or from an expert 
witness. 
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Appellee's Brief at 45-46. 
This argument assumes (1) that Chamberlain's testimony was an adequate 
substitute for instructions on the law, (2) that Chamberlain's testimony accurately 
outlined the applicable principles of law, and (3) that Chamberlain's testimony outlined 
all of the legal principles stated in the proposed instructions. 
Chamberlain did concede that a partnership or joint venture could be 
created without !!written formality" (R 1131). He also acknowledged that partners or 
co-venturers "probably" stand in an agency relationship with respect to one another (R 
1132). But, according to Chamberlain, partners "have to have discussed the authority 
for any implied authority to have occurred" (R 1132)(emphasis added). For further 
discussion of Chamberlain's testimony, see Point V, supra. 
The testimony of an expert witness is no substitute for instructions from 
the court. An expert witness presents opinions, the soundness of which the jury is free 
to either accept or reject. The court is duty-bound to instruct the jury as to the 
principles of law applicable to the issues presented by the evidence and the jury is duty-
bound to follow the court's instructions. 
The state's argument further suggests that since defense counsel, in 
closing, did not attempt to argue the legal implications of the joint venture, the 
defendant somehow waived any claim of error arising out of the court's refusal to 
instruct the jury. Counsel can argue the interpretation of the evidence and the 
apphcation of the law as the jury is given to understand the law through the court's 
instructions. The defendant could not argue the legal implications of the joint venture 
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with any credibility where there was not legal framework by which the jury could 
satisfied and whether or these parties, as a consequence of that relationship, stood in 
irljilionsliip MI HIIIK* auuiln i .is pimnpnls and agents. 
Specific Intent. The state's view of the scope of the offense of forgery has colored its 
arguments irgaiiinin* tin ;u]r<|u<ic\ ol tin mini's mslnu'lnmii (in ^pivihr intaif, 
Jury instruction no. 14-C quotes the language of the Gonzalez opinion and 
defines "pi u pose to defraud" as "simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were 
genuine in order to gain some advantage" (R 240). As the state properly observes, this 
instruction tfmake[s] clear that the jury need not identify either the particular fraud or 
the specific victim". Appellee's Brief at 27. According to the state, 1 his Iiisti iicl ion 
defined the requisite specific intent, at least to the extent such an intent needed to be 
defined Id. at 1 7 I he state notes: "[Tfhe • • was not i equir 2d to differ entiate 
between specific and general intent; it need only follow the instructions and definitions 
given bv tin i'oiiil""" Ul. 
In Lish v. Utah Power and Light Co., 27 Utah 2d 90, 93,493 P.2d 611, 613 
( Jtah Supreme Court observed: 
Ordinarily the reasoning given in an opinion of an appellate coin t 
is not to be copied as an instruction to the jury in a similar case. 
It does not necessarily state what the law is, but rather is made to 
demonstrate the correctness of the opinion. 
In the context of the facts presented in Gonzalez, the quoted language was 
a statement of law made for the purpose of demonstrating the sufficiency of the 
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evidence in that case. In the context of the evidence in the instant case, this language, 
when considered with the other instructions, told the jurors that if the defendant 
obtained any "advantage" through transactions which "culminated" in the "unauthorized" 
endorsement, they should convict the defendant. See Appellee's Brief at 27. 
Under these instructions and the state's theories of liability, the 
defendant's specific intent in endorsing the check became irrelevant because the 
requisite "purpose to defraud" could be established by proof of a "fraud" perpetrated 
"against the Bauers, Vicki Bassett and ERA Realty11 and that "fraud" was established 
without regard to the defendant's reason for, or purpose in, endorsing the check. 
Indeed, that "fraud" would have been established whether the endorsement was false or 
genuine. Even if the defendant honestly, but erroneously, believed that he had authority 
to endorse the check, he would still be guilty of forgery because the requisite "purpose 
to defraud" could be established by a "fraud" perpetrated "against the Bauers, Vicki 
Bassett and ERA Realty" which could be estabhshed notwithstanding the defendant's 
goodwill toward Packer and Mountain America Credit Union and without regard to the 
defendant's good faith in endorsing the check. 
Without argument, the district court's instructions "failed to acquaint the 
jury with the concept of specific intent." Appellant's Brief at 44. Moreover, "the district 
court's definition of 'purpose to defraud' muffled the specific intent element of this 
offense to the point where it could not be heard above the roar of the instructions 
defining the concept of general criminal intent." Id. at 44-45. 
Refusal to give a specific intent instruction was fundamental error. This 
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error was compounded by the instructions which the district court gave and which 
specific victim in order to decide whether defendant acted with a "purpose to defraud". 
Appellee's Uriel at 21 
CONCLUSION 
It us icsp i ' i l l i i l ly suljiiiitU'il nihil Ilii' t l H n i u l a n f \ I'uiiviction .'JimiM hi 
reversed. 
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